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Article 7

The Editors of this Journal have agreed to publish this Article in accordance
with the author's stylistic preferences. Consequently, portions of this Article
do not conform to the established rules of The Bluebook. Technical
irregularitiesbear no reflection on the quality of the Editors' work, but rather
are the sole responsibility of the author.

Bush v. Gore and a Proper Separation of Powers
George Anastaplo

You can learn things carrying a cat home by
the tail that cannot be learned any other way.
- Mark Twain 1
PROLOGUE

Our point of departure, for this exploration of the first principles of
American constitutionalism, is the Year 2000 Presidential election. We
have heard this weekend, as well as during the past year, from many
who are much better
qualified than I am to comment on the use and
2
elections.
of
abuse
My initial public comment on the November 7th election-an
election in which I felt a sort of proprietary interest because it happened

to fall precisely on my seventy-fifth birthday-came in the form of this
* This talk was prepared for a conference, "Bush v. Gore, One Year Later: A Constitutional
Retrospective," organized by the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal,February 15-16, 2002.
** Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A., University of Chicago,
1948; J.D., University of Chicago, 1951; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1964.
1. This apt observation, attributed to Mark Twain, was quoted by a speaker in a University of
Chicago Physics Department Colloquium during the 2000-2001 Academic Year. See, on Mark
Twain, GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER: FROM SHAKESPEARE TO JOYCE 179
(Ohio Univ. Press 1983); George Anastaplo, Law, Education,and Legal Education:Explorations,
37 BRANDEIS L.J. 585, 684 (Summer 1998-99).
2. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000 (Foundation Press, rev. ed. 2001); see
also infra notes 60 and 65. See, on Presidential elections generally, GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A COMMENTARY 89 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1989). More
extensive commentary by me on many of the issues referred to in these notes (but not on the
intricacies of the law of elections) may be found in GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT (S. Methodist Univ. Press 1971).
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Letter to the Editor (of November 10) which has been published by
several newspapers:
It is possible that our Presidential contest will remain "undecided"
for weeks to come, partly because of uncertainties in Florida.
If (a big "if')-if a prolongation of this standoff threatens to
damage the country and to subvert the authority of the next
Administration, would it not be prudent for the two major candidates
to announce an immediate recourse by them to the drawing of lots to
settle this matter? The Electoral College votes could thereafter be
easily adjusted by their supporters accordingly.
Would not this be a statesmanlike resolution to this "crisis" by both
candidates, dramatizing their character and fitness and making more
likely an era of national good will thereafter?
This approach would best be taken before the official recount,
including of the absentee ballots, is announced in Florida, thereby
making less likely the risk of having it appear that the "real loser"
won. It is fortunate that the major candidates have roughly the same
amount of popular support nationwide, making it much easier for the
country to accept this kind of self-denying compromise.
These candidates have long been extolled as pious patriots. Would
not a voluntary recourse by them to the drawing of lots in these
extraordinary circumstances, for which there are American legal as
well as Biblical precedents, testify both to their faith in Providence
and to their dedication to the common good? Certainly, this kind of
resolution would be salutary as a reminder that what always unites us
3
is much greater than what may chance to divide us from time to time.
It can be argued that a drawing of lots was, in effect, resorted to
during the ensuing month in November-December 2000, but not in that
straightforward way which would have been generally recognized as
fair. On the other hand, I have the impression that no strategy or
argument used by the contending parties made any difference in the
outcome, which is to say
that the process was inevitably more
4
"political" than "judicial."
3. See CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 13, 2000, at 2; CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 2000, §1, at 20;
HICKORY DAILY REC. (Hickory, N.C.), Nov. 15, 2000, at AI0; UNIV. OF CHI. MAROON, Nov. 17,
2000, at 7; CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at 32 (in an enigmatic form). The leading Biblical
precedent for a recourse to the drawing of lots may be found in Acts 1:15-26. My November 10,
2000, Letter to the Editor was sent out on the fiftieth anniversary of my first encounter with the
Character and Fitness Committee in Chicago. See In re George Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961);
see also GEORGE ANASTAPLO, ON TRIAL: FROM ADAM & EVE TO O.J. SIMPSON, apps. A, B, C
(Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield forthcoming 2003). Readers are reminded that Letters
to the Editor are often subject to considerable editing about which letter-writers cannot be readily
consulted.
4. Judicial actions and opinions in the Bush v. Gore controversy may be found at 531 U.S. 98
(2000) (per curiam).

20021

Bush v. Gore and a Proper Separation of Powers

Plato's Socrates has taught us that a just regime depends upon each
citizen doing the job appropriate for him.5 It should be instructive,
therefore, to consider on this occasion what we should expect, and
permit, each branch of our National Government to do. One heartening
feature of this election was the relatively small role played in November
and December 2000 by the outgoing President in determining who his
successor would be. 6 But then I have long believed (or I have believed
it salutary to insist) that who the President may be is, and was intended
to be, far less important than it is usually taken to be.

I
It can be useful for our exploration on this occasion to look, however
briefly, at three of the most important (or, at least, three of the most
instructive) cases decided by the United States Supreme Court since the
Second World War.
These are the 1952 Steel Seizure Case,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer;7 the 1954 School
Desegregation Case, Brown v. Board of Education;8 and the 1962
Reapportionment Case, Baker v. Carr.9 That is, I venture to offer here a
very short course in American constitutional law, drawing in my notes
here on my published commentaries on the Constitution.
I propose, in what follows, to make more of the primacy of the
legislative power than others usually do. Congress, if it is helped to
recognize its intended prerogatives in our constitutional system, may
use the considerable powers it still has to serve the common good by
defending itself from invasions of those prerogatives. 10
Any critic of our current practices must, in order to be truly helpful
here, recognize not only the powers of Congress but also its
shortcomings.
For instance, it is particularly troublesome that a
"supermajority" now seems to be needed for passing any controversial
bill in the Senate of the United States. This necessity is simply
improper, very much against the spirit of the Constitution where the few
5. See, e.g., PLATO, REPUBLIC. See, on the Republic, GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS
ARTIST: FROM HOMER TO PLATO & ARISTOTLE 303 (Ohio Univ. Press 1997).

6. Indeed, some have argued, Mr. Gore would probably have clearly won if he had permitted
Mr. Clinton to help him more during the campaign. See infra note 19.
7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10.

See the Dedication in WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION (Univ.

of Chi. Press 1953); see also George Anastaplo, Mr. Crosskey, the American Constitution, and
the Natures of Things, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 181 (1984); Malcolm P. Sharp, Crosskey, Anastaplo
and Meiklejohn on the United States Constitution, 20 LAW SCH. REC. U. CHI. L. SCH. 3 (Spring
1973).
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1
provisions for what we call a "supermajority" are carefully set forth.'
The practice that the Senate12 has fallen into means, in effect, that a
numerical minority can rule.

II
Now, to our three cases, beginning with the 1952 Steel Seizure Case,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.13 We can see in the opinion
of that Court a salutary reminder
of the limits to the exercise of the "war
14
power" by the President.
11. I question the systematic abuse in the United States Senate of the filibuster in this
November 1998 Letter to the Editor ("Why Should Not the Majority Rule?"):
A perverse use of party discipline in this country in recent years has been the repeated
recourse to threats of filibustering in the United States Senate, thereby subverting the
duty of the majority to rule. The November 3rd election returns mean, among other
things, that there is still no filibuster-proof margin enjoyed by the dominant party in the
Senate.
The many proposals for constitutional amendments submitted to the First Congress in
1789 included suggestions that a "supermajority" (as we call it) be required on one
issue after another. The First Congress refused to change what the Framers had done
in limiting severely-that is, to a half-dozen instances-the occasions on which more
than a majority is needed to resolve questions in either House of Congress.
The current Senate rule that keeps a bare majority from ending debate, even after a
reasonable time, is probably unconstitutional. A self-respecting Senate majority, with
the cooperation of the presiding officer, someday should be able, by the use of wellreasoned points of order, to correct both the Senate filibuster rule requiring a threefifths vote to end debate and the Senate rule requiring a two-thirds vote to change the
rules of that body.
The restoration of responsible majority rule in the Senate probably depends upon an
informed public opinion. A truly self-governing people would demand that their
legislatures should always be free to act efficiently, making due allowance for adequate
discussion, for fair procedures, and for traditional privileges.
In short, We the People have to revive, and to insist upon, a reliable standard of
constitutionalism in this country.
See CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 11, 1998, at 18; HICKORY DAILY REC. (Hickory, N.C.), Nov. 15,
1998, at A4. See, on "supermajorities" and the Constitution, GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY 105, 127, 133, 193-94, 206, 228-29,
296, 303, 310, 447 n.255, 453 n.260 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1995).
12. Proportional representation in legislatures, which we hear advocated among us today, also
tends to make responsible government difficult. The most successful legislatures for large
countries in modern times have been found among the English-speaking peoples. None of these
legislatures, so far as I know, have memberships based on proportional representation.
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 415 n.l10, 433 n.176; THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 114, 315 n.77.
14. Particularly salutary is Justice Black's forthright opinion for the Court in the Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. case. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 582-88. See, on the War
Powers Resolution, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 233, 448 n.258;
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 113, 114, 115, 315 n.72, 316 n.78.
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The Commander-in-Chief can become very confident and assertive,
if not even overbearing, in the exercise of his powers. Sometimes, of
course, the President does "know best"-and the Congress may refuse
to do what should be done.
But, except in the most extreme
the
risk
of
Congressional
inadequacy is a risk that we
circumstances,
15
run.
to
want
Furthermore, it has been pointed out, the President may "know"
things the rest of us do not, but what he "knows" may simply be wrong.
Besides, the Declaration of Independence should be authority enough
16
for the proposition that the Executive has to continually be curbed.
A recent instance of high-minded Executive usurpation that
threatened the principles of our regime was the presumptuous IranContra conspiracy. 17 This conspiracy was far more serious in its
constitutional implications than the Watergate Scandal, 18 which was
merely dirty politics; it was also far more serious than the Clinton
Scandals, which merely exposed personal shortcomings. 19
III
The Youngstown case was decided less than a decade after the end of
the Second World War. Perhaps it would have been better if the
Congress, rather than the Court, had reined in a President who had
seized the steel industry on his own authority. Even so, it was generally
agreed that the President should be kept in check here, especially when
the President may be far more moved by political than by military
considerations.
The Second World War was our last declared war. Since then, the
prerogatives of Congress with respect to the declaration of war have
15. It is rare, that is, for this country to be faced with a crisis as severe as that which
confronted Abraham Lincoln in 1861. Chief Justice Fred Vinson, in his dissenting opinion in the
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. case, sometimes seems to suggest otherwise. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 685 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
See, on Lincoln's
constitutionalism, GEORGE ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A CONSTITUTIONAL BIOGRAPHY

(Rowman & Littlefield 1999).
16. See, on the Declaration of Independence, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 15, at 11, 31.
17. See, on the Iran-arms and Contra-aid controversy, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 79, 215, 445 n.250; THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2,
at 32-33, 312 n.41, 317 n.85; see also infra note 23; and the text accompanying infra notes 43
and 47.
18. See, on the Watergate controversy, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
11, at 215, 445 n.250; THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 33.
19. I did come to believe, however, that the time came for Mr. Clinton to resign. See George
Anastaplo, Letter to the Editor,CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 10, 1998, at 2; N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1998, at A26 (National Edition) (abridged); HICKORY DAILY. REC. (Hickory, N.C.), Sept. 11,
1998, at A4; CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 13, 1998, at 38; see also supra note 6.
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been routinely ignored. That is not to deny that the Constitution
recognizes, in effect, the propriety both of
immediate self-defense and
20
of what we sometimes call police actions.
But we are now accustomed to major military undertakings which do
look like wars but which are initiated
and prosecuted for years without
21
war.
of
declarations
of
the benefit
Substitutes for declarations of war are sometimes relied upon by the
Executive. Perhaps the most plausible was the United Nations Security
Council authorization in response to the June 1950 invasion of South
Korea. Far more dubious, as substitutes for declarations of war, have
been the legislative proceedings connected with the onset22 of our
campaigns in Vietnam, in the Persian Gulf, and in Afghanistan.
Is it not simply healthier, politically as well as constitutionally, when
Congress faces up directly, and debates fully, the prospect of war?
Among the harms sustained because of the way we now go to war is a
depreciation of the sense of constitutional propriety, so much so that
Congress may not even recognize (let alone, care) that its powers have

20. Consider, for example, what even the States are permitted by the Constitution to do in
immediate self-defense. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. On the other hand, the Presidential duty to
execute the laws may require "police actions," the authority (as well as the means) for which may
often be enhanced if not even prescribed by Congress.
21. Consider, in my Letter to the Editor of October 8, 2001, the call for a restored respect for
Congressional prerogatives with respect to the initiation of wars:
The national administration, as part of its response to the monstrous crimes of
September 11, has spoken often of going to war in or against one or more countries
harboring terrorists. Attacks have been launched against Afghan targets. Now we hear
talk about Iraqi targets. There still seems to be time, in the present circumstances, to
have Congress consider a declaration of war against any country to be attacked by us.
Such a declaration, preceded by a proper debate in Congress, would help clarify the
current situation and focus everyone's attention upon what is to be done, why, and
how. It would be healthy to see, through such salutary self-discipline, a reaffirmation
in this country of the constitutional proprieties and the rule of law.
See CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 9, 2001, at 2; N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at A22 (National
Edition); CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at 34. This argument has been reinforced by my
unpublished Letter to the Editor of August 18, 2002:
The President has recognized the considerable discussion generated by the
Administration's signals that it is considering an invasion of Iraq. But this salutary
recognition of the public discourse has been undermined by Mr. Bush's insistence that
he reserves the sole right to decide the course the United States will take. Is there no
one in the Administration who can advise him that it is a constitutional affront, as well
as bad politics, to ignore in so blatant a way the exclusive power of the Congress to
declare war?
22. These campaigns were far more massive than the expedition against the Barbary pirates.
See, for a survey of such expeditions, Chief Justice Vinson's dissenting opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 683 (1952)
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
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been usurped. Also depreciated is the importance of serious national
debate about vital political matters.
Congress, if properly led, could curtail the kind of Executive

usurpation that we lament by simply turning off the funds that sustain
23
it.

This is hard to do, however, as Congressman Abraham Lincoln
discovered upon attempting to identify and to curb Presidential
misconduct preceding and during the somewhat questionable Mexican
War (which was a declared war).24
The most recent, serious incursion upon the prerogatives of Congress
by the Executive has been our current President's undertaking to
establish, on his own authority, military tribunals to deal with noncitizen "terrorists." 25 This kind of innovation, which happens in this
case to be so poorly conceived as to be almost 26
unworkable, is an
incursion also upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary.

IV
We can be reminded of Judicial usurpation, rather than of Executive
27
usurpation,
when we look
Brown
v. BoardasofitEducation.
Brown
itself was important,
even at
noble,
addressing
did a longstanding

23. This is, in part, what the Iran-Contra conspiracy was "all
about." See supra note 17.
24. See, e.g., ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 15, at 62, 308-09.
25. See 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (publication of the Executive Order signed by
the President on November 13, 2001).
26. Consider my Letter to the Editor of November 17, 2001, on this subject:
Concerns have been voiced about the November 13th Executive Order providing for
trials by military tribunals, even in the United States, of foreigners accused of acts of
"terrorism" anywhere in the world. Critics of the Justice Department's current
campaign against "terrorism" should be heartened as it becomes generally apparent
how ill-conceived even this vigorously-defended Executive Order really is.
Although it has been objected that the concurrence of only two-thirds of any tribunal
established by the Order suffices for convicting and sentencing, it has not been noticed
that the judges thus empowered need to be only two-thirds of the tribunal members
present, so long as a majority of the military officers designated for a tribunal is indeed
present. If, for example, there should be eleven officers chosen for a tribunal, only six
need to be present to permit a final decision, which decision can then be made if twothirds of those six (that is, four) agree. This can mean that little more than one-third of
all the officers who have heard the evidence during a trial can suffice for convicting
and sentencing, whatever the other two-thirds (who happen not to be present for the
decision) may believe or prefer.
Such curious anomalies suggest that this and related, potentially shameful, experiments
in the administration of American justice are not likely to endure-and for this we all,
not just suspected terrorists, can be thankful.
See CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at 30 (with an instructive cartoon); see also infra note 64.
27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 11,at 168, 439 n.209.
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problem which threatened the integrity of the regime. And the
legislatures curbed were, for the most part, State legislatures, over

which the28National Government does have considerable constitutional
authority.
It should also be recognized that Brown has had a salutary effect,
helping to redefine as it did the national position on race relations. This

position had been markedly advanced because of the Second World
War, and it was given "political teeth" by the Voting Rights Act of
1965.29
But it should be recognized as well that the Supreme Court might not
have had to do what it did in Brown, in the middle of the Twentieth
Century, if that same Court had not done what it did in the last quarter
of the Nineteenth Century. That is, the United States Supreme Court
had (in the Civil Rights Cases3 0 and in Plessy v. Ferguson3 1 ) stymied
what Congress had tried to do not only in its post-Civil War Civil
Rights Acts 32but also through its development of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
One serious consequence of the Court's misreading of the post-Civil
War Amendments was to unleash the worst elements in the State
Governments for the next half-century and more.
V
The Reapportionment Cases of 1962 and thereafter have also had a
salutary effect. 3 3 Chief Justice Warren identified this litigation as the
34
most important during his tenure.
28. See, on the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Constitution, THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, supra note 2, at 196, 198-203, 277, 320 n.94, 325 n.140.
29. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1993).
30. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 11, at 183-85.
31. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); see THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 183-85.
32. The discovery of the deeper meanings implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment is
comparable to what has happened in the development of interpretations for Magna Carta, for the
Declaration of Independence, and for the Preamble to the Constitution of 1787. See THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 228-38; THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787,
supra note 2, at 1-12.
33. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see also THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 438 n.205; THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 17374, 184-85.
34. Earl Warren had served as Attorney General and as Governor of California. See, e.g., G.
EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 84 (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. 1982); see also
THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 364 (Laurence Berns on Chief Justice Warren as "a
kind of living argument for democracy").
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But there have been problems with the way that the Court proceeded
and on what it based its actions, leading to a more or less mechanical
one-man/one-vote formula, which did35 not take sufficient account of
special circumstances in various states.
It probably would have been better if, well before 1962, Congress
had done what it should have done in addressing the severe
malapportionment that had been allowed to distort the elections of both
State and National legislators all over the country. Congress should be
able not only to protect the soundness of its own membership but also to
guarantee (as is its 36duty) a "Republican Form of Government" in every
State in the Union.
One may see here how inept the Court can be in dealing with political
questions, even when not driven and divided by partisan passions.
VI
This brings us explicitly to the Bush v. Gore37 situation, which some
still celebrate
as the heading off by the Justices of a constitutional
8
crisis.

3

Did not the Court's intervention preempt and otherwise interfere with
what the Congress might have had to do in January 2001? Is there any
reason to believe that Congress could not have addressed and disposed
of any contending claims of electoral slates and challenges 39
coming out
of Florida (and anywhere else) when the new Congress met?
The Congressional response might, at times, have been "messy"that is, "political." But that is to be expected, if not even wanted, from a
political body. Besides, elections themselves are political undertakings,
not adjudications.
VII
At the heart of my reservations about what happened in, and because
of, Bush v. Gore is, as I have already indicated, a respect for4 the
intended supremacy of the Legislature in our constitutional system. 0

35. See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
36. See, on republican government and the Republican Form of Government Guarantee in
Article IV of the Constitution, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 463
(index); THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 337 (index).
37. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
38. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURT (Princeton Univ. Press 2001).
39. See, e.g., infra note 60 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., my unpublished Letter of March 11, 2002, to the Chicago Tribune:
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This supremacy is a fundamental fact of our system, as is evident
throughout the Constitution. We were dramatically reminded of this as
recently as the Clinton Administration4 1with the subjection of the
President to an Impeachment proceeding.
What the Supreme Court did, and was permitted to do, in November
and December 2000, was encouraged by the undue apprehensiveness
among some of the public about what would happen if the Court did not
settle that controversy quickly. A similar apprehensiveness, with some
unfortunate consequences for the country, followed upon the monstrous
attacks of September 11, 2001. Symptomatic of this apprehensiveness
is the unseemly way in which the security of the Vice4 2Presidency has
been both protected and publicized the last five months.
The Constitution does provide for extensive Congressional control
over the makeup and operations of both the Executive and the Judiciary.
A series of questions can illuminate the concern I have about what did
and did not happen because of Bush v. Gore: Does legislative
supremacy still make sense, or do modern conditions require something
quite different? That is, is legislative supremacy still the best way to
assure the humane implementation of that ultimate legislative
supremacy reflected in the sovereignty of the People? Should not
Congress, partly by its use of the Powers of the Purse, make sure that
the Judiciary and the Executive respect 43(for everyone's good) the
limitations relied upon by the Constitution?

One of your readers, understandably troubled by radical measures
unilaterally these days by the Bush Administration, argues that "the U.S.
stipulates in no uncertain terms that the executive, legislative, and judicial
equal branches." (Chicago Tribune, Letters to the Editor, March 10, 2002,

resorted to
Constitution
branches are
sec. 2, p. 6)

Sometimes the judiciary, as we saw in December 2000, acts as if it is supposed to be
the dominant branch. At other times, as we now see, the executive acts that way.
But what the Constitution actually provides is that Congress, with such powers as those
of the Purse and of Impeachment, is to be the dominant branch of the National
Government, always subject of course to the sovereign Will of the People.
See also George Anastaplo, Willmoore Kendall and Leo Strauss, in WILLMOORE KENDALL:
MAVERICK OF AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES ch. 6, pt. B (John A. Murley & John Alvis eds.,
Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield 2002).
41. See, e.g., ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 15, at 324 n.455.
42. All this can be said to have begun with the way the safety of the President himself was
handled on September 11, 2001.
43. Is this not already done routinely by Congress, especially after the excitement of
"emergencies" wears off? See, e.g., supra note 17.
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VIII

Precedents for legislative supremacy in our constitutional system are
both plentiful and substantial. I have already referred to what is taken
for granted in our fundamental constitutional document, the Declaration
of Independence.
The Framers of the Constitution were themselves organized in, and
worked through, an assembly, the Constitutional Convention, which
was very much like a legislature.
The prototype for American
legislatures has been the British Parliament, which had (well before
1776) curbed the power of the Executive and which had never had to
44
contend with anything like judicial review in the form we know it.
Even Magna Carta can be understood as an insistence upon the
subordination of the Executive to the collectively-expressed will of the
community.45
Critical to the development of legislative supremacy in Britain was
the Power of the Purse effectively claimed by the House of Commons.
That power was vital to what happened, for both good and ill, to the
prerogatives of the House of Lords in the Twentieth Century. 46 And it

44. See, on judicial review, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 15, at 365 (index); THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 460 (index); THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, supra note 2, at 335 (index); see also infra note 61.
45. Magna Carta even provides for the institutionalizing of the uprising which had led to the
coercion of the King at Runymede. See Law, Education, and Legal Education, supra note 1, at
661-62. Thus, the right of revolution is recognized.
46. Those prerogatives have been severely restricted, with the ultimate fate of the House of
Lords still uncertain. I prepared, in 1999, the following memorandum on the House of Lords:
My wife and I received recently from a member of the British nobility the following
invitation, "Do let us know if you'd like to come over to witness the death throes of
hereditary peerage." This note came as something of a shock, originating as it did with
a couple who had been our gracious hosts on their baronial estate a few years ago and
with whom we had visited the House of Lords a decade earlier in the course of my
study of that venerable part of the Constitution of the United Kingdom.
I had heard, of course, of the plans of the current Labour Government to abolish the
role of at least the hereditary elements of the House of Lords in the legislative process
of the country. But, somehow, I had not really grasped this prospect with my soul.
The casualness of the note from which I have quoted makes the proposed abolition
seem virtually inevitable, matching the casualness (for me, at any rate) of the
discussions heretofore in Great Britain of this vital matter.
The proposal of the Abolitionists draws upon longstanding opposition to the House of
Lords as undemocratic, if not even as anti-democratic, and as such very much out of
touch with the political principles and tendencies of our age. The Abolitionists draw
upon deep class animosities in Britain of a kind known in the United States only in
racial conflicts. It has not helped the cause of the House of Lords that its Members
have all too often been mindlessly conservative in their sentiments and votes.
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of the Purse that made the Iran-Contra
is the importance of the Power
47
attempt as dubious as it was.
The supremacy of the legislature may be seen also in the State
legislatures at the time that the Constitution was drafted. It may be seen
as well in the preceding national constitution, the Articles of
Confederation, which left the legislature so much in the ascendancy that
Even so, I seriously began studying the House of Lords, a generation ago, when that
House blocked (albeit temporarily, as has to be the case) a local government
reorganization bill pushed by the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher.
"PEERS-THANK YOU FOR SAVING LONDON'S DEMOCRACY" was the
banner I saw displayed shortly thereafter, just across the Thames from Parliament, on
an office building run by a "left-wing" local government threatened by "reform."
Temporarily blocking, and thereby promoting reconsideration of, dubious legislation
proposed by the House of Commons has been a small part of what the House of Lords
has done in this century. The House of Lords has been even more useful in improving
legislation, often filling in the considerable gaps left in bills passed by the House of
Commons. Indeed, the House of Lords has frequently been depended upon to do the
detailed work on a bill that the much more political, and hence much busier, House of
Commons may not have time for. (For one thing, the Members of the House of
Commons, except for those who are Ministers, do not have adequate staffs. The
Members of the House of Lords do not have proper staffs either, but they do have
leisure. In the United States, the courts do some of the filling in of gaps that the House
of Lords does in Britain.)
Related to this workmanlike function of the House of Lords is the recognition that it
can discuss controversial or sensitive matters somewhat more frankly, and yet in a less
partisan manner, than the House of Commons is usually inclined to do. It helps not
only that members of the House of Lords do not have to stand for the next election, but
also that the Lords are apt to have among them an expert or two on virtually any
subject that legislation touches. These experts have as well the time to study their
subjects in some depth. Because of their family experiences and class interests they
can approach issues from a much longer view than active politicians ("creatures of a
day") can afford or are inclined to do.
No doubt, efforts will be made, if abolition does go through as planned, to supply in
another way what the House of Lords has routinely done heretofore in Parliament.
Still, the outsider who appreciates British institutions cannot help but wonder whether
there are not grave risks run when a centuries-old institution is dismantled, especially
when there has been no showing that the chronic problems facing the British have
anything to do with the traditions, the Membership, or the practices of the House of
Lords. The invitation we received, from which I here quoted, concludes with the
observation, "Lots of room for you both here." That can be appreciated as gracious
indeed, even as one wonders whether there is ever truly "room" for the outsider who
presumes to study and pass judgment upon the workings of a political system that he
can know only from afar, no matter how often he visits the country. Critical here,
perhaps, are not the lessons one might teach others about the prudence one discovers to
be inherent in their institutions, but rather what one learns thereby about prudence
which one can thereafter bring to bear upon assessing the time-tested institutions of
one's own country.
See HICKORY DAILY REC. (Hickory, N.C.), Apr. 14, 1999, at A4 (for an abridgement of this
memorandum).
47. See supra note 17.
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it provided for neither
a separate national executive nor a permanent
48
national judiciary.
Furthermore, it is taken for granted throughout the Articles of
Confederation, as it later was in the Constitution of 1787, that the
principal branch of the typical State Government is the legislative
branch. At times, it can even seem to be assumed in the Articles of
Confederation4 9 that the legislative was the only branch of such
governments.
No doubt, the Articles went too far in relying upon legislative
supremacy. But the provisions in the Constitution of 1787 for an
executive and a judiciary still leave Congress able to be very much in
control, subject of course to the Will of the People. This legislative
preeminence was evidently considered essential in a republican regime.
Ix
One of the consequences of the approach I have taken on this
occasion is a questioning of the now long-accepted institution
of
50
judicial review of Acts of Congress for their constitutionality.
Most scholars recognize that there is little indication prior to and
during 1787 that such judicial review was either generally desired or
explicitly provided for. This is not the place to explain, still another
time, how dubious the readings were in Marbury v. Madison5 1-the
readings by the Court both of the jurisdictional provision in Article III
of the Constitution and of the status of any acts of Congress that might
indeed be unconstitutional. 5 2 The immediately perceived limitations of
Marbury are reflected in the fact that half a century could pass thereafter
53
without invalidation by the Supreme Court of any Acts of Congress.
But the principal arguments against judicial review are not "historical"
but rather "philosophical," thus taking account of what a republican
regime properly calls for.

48. See, on the Articles of Confederation, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 15, at 361 (index);
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 455 (index); THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, supra note 2, at 455 (index).
49. Thus, there was no permanent national judiciary established, and the Congress exercised
the executive powers of the National Government. See supra note 48.
50. See supra note 44.
51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
52. See, e.g., Leonard W. Levy, Marbury v. Madison, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1199 (MacMillan Publ'g Co. 1986); see also supra note 44.
53. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see also ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
supra note 15, at 363 (index); THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 457
(index); THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 333 (index).
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I hasten to add that we do not have in Bush v. Gore an instance of
judicial review, for State Governments are properly subject to
supervision in various respects by the National Government (not just by
the National Judiciary, however). But what the Supreme Court did in
Bush v. Gore was somewhat in the spirit of Marbury v. Madison, and, as
such, likewise open to serious question.
I mention in passing, before leaving the subject of judicial review,
that current efforts by the Supreme Court to restrain exercises by the
Congress of its Commerce Power are largely illusory. One consequence
of the steady "globalization" that we are seeing is that Congress will be
required to regulate, as best it can, the economy of the United States,
sometimes in exasperating detail.5 4
X
I do not mean to pass judgment on what various Florida officers, both
judicial and executive (or quasi-executive officers), did from55 time to
time during the course of the election and recount in that State.
The Florida officials involved in these proceedings ranged from the
Governor and Secretary of State to local election officers and judges.
State courts are routinely relied upon, all over this country, to supervise
and guide, in inevitably varying circumstances, the interpretation and
application of State statutes and regulations. Much of what they do has
to be ad hoc, with a sense of fair play depended upon, as diverse
arrangements are relied upon in diverse circumstances.
Such variety may seem to some to arouse Equal Protection concerns.
But those concerns, as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in
November and December 2000, seem rather contrived, considering how
diverse the electoral arrangements and practices evidently were
throughout Florida (as well as nationwide) in November 2000.56
This is not to suggest that everything the Florida Government did,
through one or another of its functionaries, was either above reproach or
54. See, for my comment on Justice Clarence Thomas's arguments in United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), and in related cases, George Anastaplo, "McCarthyism," the Cold War, and
Their Aftermath, 43 S.D. L. REV. 103, 151 (1998). See, for the "philosophical" arguments
referred to, Herman Belz, The Amendments to the Constitution:A Commentary, 40 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 395 (1996) (book review); and Eva T.H. Brann, Abraham Lincoln: A Constitutional
Biography, 46 S.D. L. REV. 666 (2000) (book review).
55. The Florida Legislature had earlier enacted relevant statutes and threatened to enact still
more at once if things did not go as it wanted in the Florida Courts.
56. The United States Supreme Court, evidently aware that such diversity would continue,
took the curious precaution of indicating that its rulings with respect to Equal Protection in Bush
v. Gore were of limited precedential value. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per
curiam).
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immune from any official scrutiny. But I have been suggesting that the
authoritative assessment on this occasion should have been done
primarily by the Congress of the United States, once the Florida
authorities had done their best.
XI
The Florida authorities, if the United States Supreme Court had not
intervened as it did in this matter, would (before Congress met in
January 2001) have almost certainly settled upon at least one plausible
slate of Presidential Electors. Political and other maneuvering may
have been such that two plausible slates of electors, or at least
substantial challenges to the "official" slate, would have been submitted
to Congress.
The State legislature and the more influential State officials would
probably have come out decisively for Mr. Bush. But it was obvious
that the other side was moved, in its insistence upon recounts, by its
evidently firm conviction that more voters went to the polls intending to
vote for Mr. Gore than had intended to vote for Mr. Bush.5 7
The challenges posed and the evidence available and used in January
2001 would have taken into account what would be likely to happen in
the Congress, which would have had to deal with the slates submitted.
XII
What, then, did the United States Supreme Court insist upon saving
us from?
Congress, upon being confronted by contending claims, would have
had to decide which slate of Florida Electors to accept and thereafter to
declare the winners of the national election accordingly. 58 If one of the
Florida slates had been clearly superior in its credentials, especially if
thus perceived by the public at large, then that probably would have
been the one accepted by Congress.
Public opinion, in this situation, would have taken into account
whatever recounts had been made and how they were made, recounts
that could have continued through much of December. It would have
been difficult for the politicians in Congress to seem simply partisan in
57. Is it a conservative principle to insist upon keeping and protecting whatever one happens
to "acquire" first? Even so, it remains to be sorted out how the current Bush administration has
been hampered, in what it could do and in what it could resist doing, because of lingering
questions about its legitimacy. See, e.g., infra note 64.
58. See, on the selection of Presidents, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 337
(index).
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responding to the claims submitted and the evidence relied upon.
Besides, they do have their oaths of office to guide
them somewhat, as
59
well as their own concern for the national interest.
If, however, the matter remained so inconclusive that Members of
Congress did not feel either "justified" or "safe" in deciding one way or
another, then another stage in the proceedings would have been reached.
That is, the House of Representatives, voting by States, would have had
to choose a President-and that probably would have meant, if party
discipline could be maintained, the choice of Mr. Bush.6 °
Thus, it seems to me, Mr. Gore could not have been chosen as
President unless he came out of Florida with a slate that appeared
clearly superior in its claims to that of his opponent. That probably
would have been hard (not impossible) to do in the face of the
certifications issued by the principal Florida authorities.
XIII
We expect, and should usually want, "political" concerns to move
political men and women in much of what they do. And that can even
include what they may have to do in choosing a President. Thus, in
some circumstances, the Congress, or the House of Representatives, can
properly be as "political" as the People had been in casting the ballots
they did on Election Day.
The legitimacy of Congress is not properly called into question when
it acts "politically," however much it may be faulted from time to time
for its judgment. But Courts are different, or at least they are supposed
to be different, partly because they cannot be6 1held accountable in the
way that Congress (like the President) may be.
59. Of course, a concern for the national interest can take curious forms, as may be seen in the
statement issued by Justice Scalia when the Supreme Court ordered that the recount in Florida be
stopped pending the Court's review of the case. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring). See, on the Justice, George Anastaplo, In re Antonin Scalia, in 28
PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 22 (1999). Compare Justice Stevens's dissent on that

occasion. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. For how the State delegations in the House of Representatives were allocated between the
principal political parties after the 2000 Election, see FEC, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2000: ELECTION
RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE, AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 141-89 (June 2001), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/
cover.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2002). I will leave to others to puzzle out whether all this might
have meant that Joseph Lieberman would have been named Vice President by the Senate, since
the Republicans controlled only fifty seats after the 2000 elections. Id. See, for how others have
assessed the Florida situation, Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power Over
PresidentialElections, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851, 909 n.295 (2002).
61. In addition, the Justices of the Supreme Court are apt, as usually significantly older than
Members of Congress, to be somewhat "out of touch" with the political currents of the times.
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Judges rely, for their standing in the community, upon the
expectation that they can usually be depended upon for the exercise of
sound judgment. Should it not have been obvious to the United States
Supreme Court that it would be virtually impossible for it not to appear
partisan and political in its intervention, especially if it should be
believed that it in effect selected Mr. Bush as President? That is, should
it not have been obvious to the Supreme Court that it would not be its
learning or its good will that would likely be called into question, but
62
rather that upon which it most depends for its authority, its judgment?
EPILOGUE

I have suggested that both the Executive and the Judiciary routinely
infringe upon the prerogatives and the duties of the Legislature, that
there are here constitutional improprieties and hence risks for our
regime which should be stoutly questioned both by Congress and by the
People.
I should not close, however, without again recognizing, even if only
in passing, that the prerogatives of the Judiciary are also infringed upon
from time to time by the other branches. Executive infringement may
be seen in the recourse to military tribunals already referred to, the
creation and operation of which by the Executive
may trespass upon
63
both Congressional and Judicial premises.
Congressional infringement upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary
may be seen in what Congressional committees all too often do. This is
illustrated in another of my Letters to the Editor:
The appearance before a Senate conmmittee of a former chairman of
Enron on February 12 was hardly edifying. Senators, like the rest of
us, are entitled to that freedom of speech which they vigorously
exploited on that occasion to condemn predatory business practices
and remarkably self-serving corporate "leadership."
But is it not improper to subpoena a citizen to appear before a
Congressional committee, knowing that he will almost certainly
invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent-and then have
twenty-one Senators subject him to bipartisan abuse? Should we not

And, it should be emphasized, it is quite difficult to distinguish the "constitutional" from the
"political" in "constitutional law" determinations. See infra note 62.
62. The Supreme Court, in not appreciating what the response was likely to be among
thoughtful citizens, displayed that political ineptness which can be expected from older men who
are out of touch. See supra note 61. It remains to be seen how adept the Senate will be hereafter
in assessing United States Supreme Court nominees with respect to their sensitivity to
Congressional prerogatives.
63. See supra note 26.
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still prefer to have both an indictment and a trial before prominent
public servants mercilessly condemn a potential defendant?

In some instances, one suspects, the attackers were trying to purge
themselves of their former associations with the target of their abuse.
What a way to celebrate the birthday of
64 that great champion of
constitutional propriety, Abraham Lincoln!
It is with respect to such matters as this that the Judiciary has truly
something useful to say about constitutional proprieties in the "trials" of
persons, something which the Judiciary can probably
do better (at least
65
at this time) than any other branch of government.

64. This Letter to the Editor of February 15, 2002, has been published in abridged forms. See,
e.g., CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 2002, § 1, at 20. The following Letter to the Editor, by me, of June 13,
2002, supplements my February 2002 Letter:
We were treated last February to the unseemly spectacle of twenty-one Senators
publicly condemning a former chairman of Enron before he was officially indicted for
anything. Now, the President and his Attorney General imitate those Senators by
condemning as "a bad guy" a former Chicago gang member, suspected of thinking
"dirty bombs," who has been jailed without either an indictment or the prospect of a
trial. In this fashion the traditional guarantees of citizens are depreciated and a salutary
respect for our leadership is undermined.
Does not an enduring security depend, at least for us, upon taking seriously the spirit as
well as the letter of the Constitution?
One could suspect, in February, that some of the Senatorial attackers of predatory
businessmen were trying to purge themselves of their former associations with the
target of their abuse. Is the current attack on bad guys who have been thwarted
intended to help us forget that the truly bad guys were not noticed in time last
September by those who had the duty to protect us from monstrous deeds?
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 13, 2002, at 2; CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 20, 2002, at 30; see also supra
note 26. Related to these concerns about the proper rule of law are those expressed in my Letter
to the Editor of July 17, 2002, on the John Walker Lindh case:
Much, perhaps most, of our effort on behalf of Homeland Security has been, for some
time now, woefully misdirected, thereby wasting tremendous resources (both spiritual
and material) that could be put to much better use for the common good.
It will be a sign that we as a people have begun to recover our balance, morally as well
as politically, when it comes to be generally recognized how unduly, if not even
cynically, dramatized the conduct is which has evidently gotten a silly young man a
twenty-year sentence for "providing service to the Taliban."
Much more dubious "service" is routinely provided to evil-doing by the fearful and
uninformed among us who invest would-be terrorists with far more power and
enduring influence than they are ever likely to have.
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 22, 2002, at 2; see also CHI. TRIB., July 24, 2002, § 1, at 18
(publishing an abridged version); see also supra note 26.
65. For citations to further discussions by me of the matters touched upon on this occasion,
see George Anastaplo, An Autobiographical Bibliography (1947-2001), 20 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
581-710 (2000); George Anastaplo, Tables of Contentsfor His Books and PublishedCollections
(1950-2001), 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 219-87 (Fall 2000-2001); see also George Anastaplo, Prudence
and the Constitution: On the Year 2000 Presidential Election Controversy, in TEMPERED
STRENGTH: STUDIES IN THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF PRUDENTIAL LEADERSHIP (Ethan Fishman
ed., 2002).

